United Nations S/2013/352

# Security Council

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13 June 2013

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## Letter dated 13 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my letter dated 10 June 2013 (S/2013/342) regarding the continued support of the Government of South Sudan to the rebels in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and Darfur, the so-called Sudanese Revolutionary Front, I have the honour to enclose herewith the following documents, which contain detailed information about said support:

- Report dated 10 May 2013 of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism on border corridors identification missions (annex I)
- List of positions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army inside Sudanese territory as of June 2013 (annex II)
- Document on the Government of South Sudan supporting and harbouring Sudanese rebel groups (annex III).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

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# Annex I

## Report of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism on border corridors identification missions

### Mission 1

**27 April 2013**

- The joint team travelled from Kadugli to Heiglig by helicopter;
- From Kadugli Airport the team moved to the border area by ground transport;
- The team was stopped by South Sudan guard element at the point with global positioning system (GPS) reference N9°46'17.2" E29°31'11.0", around 3.0 kilometres north of the zero-line location as per the coordinates of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan;
- Lacking permission to proceed, the team turned back.

### Mission 2

**4 May 2013**

- The joint team travelled from Kadugli to Heiglig by helicopter;
- From Kadugli Airport the team moved to the border area by ground transport;
- The team, having representatives from Juba after several negotiations with South Sudan guard posts personnel, managed to go further than the first time, but was finally stopped at the position with GPS reference N9°45'03.5" E29°32'05.8". This point corresponds to a location of Sudan checkpoint of the border-crossing corridor;
- The senior representative of the South Sudan security element deployed at the area requested to return the vehicles back to the territory of the Sudan and allowed the team personnel to wait until the situation was clarified;
- Finally, as no permission to carry out the mission was granted by the security element, the joint team was escorted back to the territory of the Sudan, and the team returned to base.

## Map


First mission was not allowed to move beyond this point:
N9°46'17.2" E29°31'11.0"
Second mission was not allowed to move beyond the point 183

| | Point | Description | GPS reference | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | N | E |
| 1 | 00177 | Zero-line crossing the Heiglig-Bentiu road | 9° 44' 57.0" | 29° 32' 10.7" |
| 2 | 00185 | Sudan checkpoint | 9° 45' 03.5" | 29° 32' 05.8" |
| 3 | 00186 | South Sudan checkpoint | 9° 44' 50.5" | 29° 32' 15.6" |

10 May 2013

(*Signed*) Brigadier General Fessana Kidano **Fanta**
Chief, Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

(*Signed*) Brigadier General Osama **Mohamadin**
Sudanese Armed Forces Senior National Monitor

(*Signed*) Colonel William **Padhor**
Sudan People's Liberation Army Senior National Monitor

## Annex II

### Positions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army inside Sudanese territory as of June 2013

| *No.* | *Position* | *Coordinates* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Haloof area | (28, 47, 10 and 32, 07, 32) |
| 2 | Um Doheeb area | (37, 54, 09 and 30, 26, 03) |
| 3 | Kaka Tejaria area | (23, 34, 10 and 32, 09, 27) |
| 4 | Bahr Alarab | (57, 52, 09 and 27, 34, 25) |
| 5 | Al-jarif | (07, 52, 59 and 27, 59, 37) |
| 6 | Al-jao | (52, 16, 10 and 29, 57, 25) |
| 7 | Lake of Abiad | (14, 18, 15 and 20, 57, 25) |
| 8 | Kosovo Coup | (47, 04, 12 and 57, 13, 33) |
| 9 | Seri Mulagah | (28, 38, 08 and 34, 14, 24) |
| 10 | Al-Adham | (43, 02, 11 and 20, 07, 33) |
| 11 | Al-binis | (33, 35, 11 and 16, 11, 33) |
| 12 | Kaka | (41, 34, 10 and 19, 09, 32) |
| 13 | Al-furga | (50, 21, 09 and 25, 45, 24) |
| 14 | Ganjoal Coup | (61, 72, 09 and 31, 55, 29) |

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**Positions of the forces of the State of South Sudan within the borders of the Sudan**



## Annex III

### Document on the Government of South Sudan supporting and harbouring Sudanese rebel groups

1. The Government of South Sudan is supplying and harbouring groups of the Sudanese rebel alliance named the "Sudan Revolutionary Front".

2. The Director General of Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence (Major General Ball) is personally tasked with this job, assisted by a group of senior officers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army.

3. Some recent cases of support to and harbouring of the Sudan Revolutionary Front can be summarized as follows:

(a) Mobilizing, organizing and supporting militarily and logistically the Sudan Revolutionary Front forces that attacked Abu Karshula and other surrounding villages in Southern Kordofan State and Um Rowaba in Northern Kordofan State;

The rebel groups supported were as follows:

- The Justice and Equality Movement force, comprised of 400 elements in 55 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers supplied with heavy military equipment
- Sudan Liberation Army-Menawi group, comprised of 200 elements in 22 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers supplied with heavy military equipment
- Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid group, comprised of 200 elements in 22 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers supplied with heavy military equipment
- Sudan People's Liberation Army ninth division battalion in 25 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers supplied with heavy military equipment
- Sudan People's Liberation Army-Government of South Sudan supported the above rebel groups with the following:

  2 fuel tankers

  27 trucks loaded with foodstuffs

  2 rocket launchers (20 barrels)

  2 rocket launchers (107 mm)

  2 aircraft dual machine guns (14.5 mm)

(b) The Government of South Sudan is harbouring the Justice and Equality Movement leaders and facilitates their residence in and movement around Jupa, Bentiu, Rubkona, Ayda, Fangak and Renk. Furthermore, the Government of South Sudan offers the Justice and Equality Movement various types of military training, including in intelligence and security. In addition, the Government of South Sudan is providing their injured elements with medical care.

(c) The Government of South Sudan is supporting and harbouring the Sudan Liberation Army-Menawi in the Raja area and allowing the group to recruit new elements. It also supplies them with fuel, military equipment and militarily equipped

Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers, in addition to offering medical care for injured elements of the group.

Examples can be cited as follows:

(i) On 29 March 2013, a force of Sudan Liberation Army-Menawi, commanded by Ahmed Abu Digin, crossed the border from South Darfur to evacuate some injured elements to Raja and to be resupplied and equipped by Colonel Rigan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence officer in Raja;

(ii) On 22 April 2013, a Sudan Liberation Army-Menawi force comprised of 36 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers crossed from South Darfur to Raja to evacuate injured elements;

(iii) On 30 April 2013, the headquarters of Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence invited Sudan Liberation Army leader Meni Arko Menawi for a meeting, which took place in Juba in May 2013.

(d) The Government of South Sudan supported the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid rebel group with the following:

(i) Military training for 450 elements in Bardla training camp in Aweel, 65 elements in Godley-west Juba, and 50 intelligence officers in Juba;

(ii) Providing cash for the movement leaders in Kampala through the Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence representative in Uganda;

(iii) Sponsored the group's general conference held in Juba in June 2013 to select the new executive office.

(e) Government of South Sudan support for rebel groups in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States can be summarized as follows:

(i) Continuing to finance salaries and payroll for the ninth and tenth Sudan People's Liberation Army divisions in the two States;

(ii) Facilitation of the movement of the rebel leaders and elements and provision of continuous logistical support;

(iii) Importation of 53 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers by Nyala Cargo Company via Juba Airport from 12 to 14 May 2013 to be stored in bases belonging to Yonan Musa and Saeed Kajo in Juba, before handing them over to the groups;

(iv) Evacuation of 14 injured elements via Antinov from Unity State to Juba to be treated in the Victoria Clinic there;

(v) Transport of boxes of money via private jet on 14 May 2013 from Juba Airport to Rubkona town;

(vi) Provision of safe houses in Juba for injured elements to be treated in Juba or in transit to be transported farther to Ethiopia after providing them with Government of South Sudan emergency travel documents;

(vii) On 23 April 2013 supported a force in their way to Trogey area with tanks, lubricant oil and ammunition;

(viii) On 22 April 2013, a Sudan People's Liberation Army delegation left Lake Alabiad for Fariang. At 13.00 hours, the delegation left for Falog and met Malik Agar in Adar where the delegation was informed about the current military situation in southern Blue Nile State. The deputy military staff received military supplies for the tenth Sudan People's Liberation Army division in order to escalate military operations in southern Blue Nile State, and after that the delegation left for Asosa;

(ix) On 20 April 2013, the Sudan People's Liberation Army delegation headed by Lieutenant-General James Ajongo, deputy army staff, and Brigadier General Kolong Maniang held a meeting with Abdal-Aziz Alhilo, Jibril and Major-General Jagod at Lake Albiad;

(x) On 1 April 2013, two infantry battalions from the tenth Sudan People's Liberation Army division were sent from Abong to the Yafta and Yabos areas;

(xi) On 27 March 2013, artillery munitions and huge amounts of light and heavy weapons were transported by the Sudan People's Liberation Army from the Fagok area to Yafta;

(xii) On 25 March 2013, 200 barrels of gasoline were transported by the Sudan People's Liberation Army from Flood oilfield to Yafta oil station to support the ninth Sudan People's Liberation Army division;

(xiii) Lieutenant-Colonel Ashwil, Major Samuel Koj and Captain John Koang from the Tonj region were coordinating between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the ninth Sudan People's Liberation Army division;

(xiv) On 29 April 2013, the tenth Sudan People's Liberation Army division in the Benes area in Blue Nile State was reinforced by about 50 Toyota four-wheel drive land cruisers;

(xv) The Fanjak area was used as a supply base and guarded by a joint force from rebel movements comprising 18 military cars. This base is under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James (from the Sudan People's Liberation Army military intelligence in Bentiu);

(xvi) The above-mentioned commanders are still supporting the Abdal-Aziz Alhilo group with artillery munitions, anti-tanks equipment and missiles;

(xvii) On 13 May 2013, Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence Major-General Jagod Mokwar supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army Nuba Mountains division with 130 barrels of fuel;

(xviii) On 13 May 2013, 500 ammunition boxes were transferred to the Sudan Revolutionary Front forces instead of the Sudan People's Liberation Army forces in the Nuba Mountains;

(xix) Until 20 May 2013, about 20 elements from Sudan People's Liberation Army-Nuba Mountains were being trained, under the supervision of Sudan People's Liberation Army military intelligence, to use anti-aircraft equipment (specifically SAM 7);

(xx) Sudan People's Liberation Army military intelligence, under the supervision of Lieutenant-General Malik Agar supplied the Sudan Revolutionary Front with about 120,000 pounds (per month) in order to support their military operations;

(xxi) On 19 May 2013, and under the direct supervision of Jamis Godwil, a number of military vehicles loaded with various types of military supplies was sent to support the Sudan Revolutionary Front in the Nuba Mountains;

(xxii) On 28 May 2013, two military vehicles were loaded with 60 car radiators and 50 batteries, 200 internal tubes and 40 other boxes full of different communications equipment for VSAT installation, which were received by Lieutenant Colonel Kual from Sudan People's Liberation Army military intelligence in Unity State;

(xxiii) On 2 June 2013, that equipment was received by Justice and Equality Movement leader Mohamed Adam Badradin at the "Tabania" area;

(xxiv) On 3 June 2013, Sudan People's Liberation Army intelligence transported Justice and Equality Movement leader Suliman Jamos to the border with Uganda. The Justice and Equality Movement leader Suliman Jamos arrived in Kampala and left for Europe shortly thereafter;

(xxv) On 4 June 2013, the Al-hilo group received fuel supplies at the "Tabania" area in order to send it to the Justice and Equality Movement, which had already arrived from Darfur;

(xxvi) On 4 June 2013, one vehicle loaded with spare parts (15 batteries, 80 internal tubes) was sent by the Al-hilo group military supply officer, Yonan Musa.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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**General Assembly**
**Tenth emergency special session**
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

**Security Council**
**Sixty-eighth year**

## Identical letters dated 14 June 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I regret to inform you of the ongoing obstruction of efforts to resuscitate the Middle East peace process and the deterioration of the situation due to Israel's relentless pursuit of unlawful and destructive policies against the Palestinian people and throughout the Palestinian land. Of grave impact in this regard is the illegitimate settlement campaign by which Israel, the occupying Power, continues to forcibly establish the facts in relation to the territory of the State of Palestine, including in East Jerusalem, with the deliberate intent of altering the demography and the physical situation on the ground in order to prejudge a final solution to the conflict.

This illegal campaign — involving, inter alia, settlement and wall construction, land confiscations, home demolitions, displacement of more Palestinian civilians and exploitation of natural resources, as well as blatant permissiveness and support for the lawlessness and terror of the Israeli settlers it has illegally transferred — continues unabated, even during this period of intense international engagement in the search for peace. As such, Israel continues to impose physical conditions on, and obstacles to, the resumption of direct peace negotiations.

Indeed, although Israel proclaims readiness to return to negotiations "at any time", there is a clear proviso. This readiness is based primarily on the condition that it can simultaneously carry out its settlement activities all over the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in breach of international law and in total contradiction of the objectives of the negotiations. In the midst of all the distortions and diversions, we must here recall that those objectives are to achieve lasting peace and security on the basis of the two-State solution by bringing a definitive end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and by resolving all final status issues, including a just solution for the Palestine refugees based on General Assembly resolution 194 (III). None of Israel's actions are consistent with these



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long-overdue objectives, nor are they conducive to creating the appropriate environment for their realization.

In this regard, I draw your attention to a recent report by an Israeli organization monitoring settlement activities, Peace Now, which reveals a dramatic rise of more than 350 per cent in Israeli settlement construction in the first three months of 2013, as compared to the same period in 2012. This fact alone is a reflection of Israel's true intentions vis-à-vis the peace process in general and the rights of the Palestinian people in particular, including their right to self-determination and freedom. Rather than acting to end its 46-year military occupation, Israel is blatantly entrenching its control over the land and its domination of the Palestinian people.

Recent reports reveal that the Israeli Government is forging ahead with plans for the construction of hundreds more settlement units in the current period. This includes a decision by the Israeli Supreme Court, on 5 June, to allow for the construction of 700 units in the illegal settlement of "Alei Zahav". On 6 June, it was also revealed that plans have been approved for the construction of a new highway interchange aimed at connecting illegal settlements in Occupied East Jerusalem with the illegal settlement of "Ma'ale Adumim" in the centre of the Territory. This interchange is located in the "E1" area and would facilitate Israel's attempts to colonize that area. Then, on 12 June, reports emerged that plans are proceeding for the building of 538 units in the illegal settlement of "Itamar", an isolated settlement near Nablus, thus enlarging the settlement fivefold, as well as for the construction of 550 units in the illegal settlement of "Bruchin", which began as a so-called "outpost".

Further aggravating the situation are the provocative statements by Israeli officials, including the Deputy Defence Minister, who in recent media comments stated that "there will never be a Palestinian State" and suggested Jordan as an alternative. We condemn and reject all such provocations, including those committed on a daily basis by Israel's extremist settlers, and illegal Israeli actions, which belie Israel's professed commitment to the two-State solution, revealing instead the true nature and intentions of the current Government, and undermine the serious peace efforts of United States Secretary of State John Kerry and regional and international partners.

In contrast, the Palestinian leadership's commitment to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace by which the State of Palestine and Israel can live side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders is unquestionable. We thus reiterate our appeal to the international community, including the Security Council, to act with urgency to uphold the law, to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people and to salvage the waning hopes for peace.

The international community must firmly reject Israel's empty, offensive pretexts and be resolute in demanding a halt to all illegal Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. This must include an end to the settlement campaign, which is gravely diminishing the viability of the two-State solution and sabotaging the hopes for meaningful peace negotiations to be resumed in order to bring an end to this tragic conflict. To remain permissive of settlement activities, regardless of their manifestation, is to allow for the trampling of international law and the destruction of the two-State solution, with far-reaching consequences for the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace as well as for the region and our global community.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 467 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 31 May 2013 (A/ES-10/595-S/2013/328), constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feda **Abdelhady-Nasser**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2013/354

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2013

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# Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2056 (2012), in which the Council requested me to develop and implement, in consultation with regional organizations, a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues, and to resolution 2071 (2012), in which the Council welcomed my appointment of a Special Envoy for the Sahel to mobilize international efforts, formulate a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and engage actively in defining the parameters of a comprehensive solution to the Malian crisis. The report provides an update on the situation in the Sahel, the activities of my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, since his appointment in October 2012, and the formulation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (see annex), taking into account existing regional and international initiatives.

## II. Background

2. For much of the past year, the world watched in horror as long-standing political grievances in Mali were overshadowed by appalling acts of violence carried out by insurgents linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Since the beginning of the Malian crisis in January 2012, more than half a million people are estimated to have fled and sought refuge either in Malian host communities or in neighbouring countries. Serious human rights violations committed by armed groups and Government soldiers, including summary executions and illegal arrests, recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against women and children, abductions of children and destruction and looting of property, are currently under investigation, while access to basic social services is limited, particularly in the north. In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, 53 per cent of schools remain closed, while in the Kidal region, schools have not reopened at all.

3. Considerable efforts have been made by France, Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and the Security Council to help the people of Mali in stabilizing their country. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MISNUSMA) will play a key role in consolidating these hard won gains. However, the problems in Mali

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should not be seen in isolation. While the deployment of peacekeepers is a critical component of the international response to the current crisis, the countries of the region recognize that sustainable peace and security will require collective action in addressing the root causes of instability that extend well beyond Mali's borders.

4. The Sahel stretches from Mauritania to Eritrea, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan, a belt dividing the Sahara desert and the savannahs to the south. The historic trade routes across Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are the most vulnerable to terrorist and criminal networks. The terrain is harsh and, in the best of cases, extremely difficult to control. The Algeria-Mali border alone stretches for 1,300 km. Moreover, developments in the Sahel-Sahara region affect and are affected by developments in North and West Africa. It will therefore be necessary to remain flexible and inclusive, engaging Governments and the population in Sahelian States as and when problems affect them.

**Governance and security challenges**

5. Countries in the Sahel have been dealing with successive political and humanitarian crises for years. Weak governance and its impact on State institutions, including insufficient border management, have dramatically diminished the capacity of the Sahelian States to effectively deliver basic services, promote broad-based political participation and protect human rights. Widespread corruption, coupled with the inability of States to deliver basic services such as effective policing, justice, access to water, affordable health care and education, has resulted in a widening gap in State-society relations. At the same time, chronic political instability, evident in recurrent unconstitutional changes of government, violent electoral processes and social conflicts, is a direct result of the lack of institutionalized political dialogue, weak parliaments and contested judicial systems.

6. The situation has left the Sahelian countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity resulting from armed conflict, terrorist activities, illicit trafficking and related organized crime. I am particularly concerned by the apparent links between criminal syndicates involved in drug trafficking and related organized crime, as well as non-State armed groups active in the region. I am also alarmed by the activities of terrorist organizations and other militant groups, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, as well as other transnational criminal organizations. They have committed acts of terrorism and abuses of human rights, increased the widespread flow of arms and engaged in human trafficking, drug trafficking and other illicit practices, while eroding State authority in many of the most vulnerable sections of society in the countries of the Sahel. In doing so, they have restricted opportunities for development.

7. The double attack by the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest suicide bombers on a barracks and a French-operated uranium mine in the Niger on 23 May 2013, which killed 35 people and wounded dozens, demonstrates that the Sahel remains vulnerable to the scourge of terrorism. Compounding this challenge, terrorism also has the potential to infiltrate into the wider region, as demonstrated by a serious hostage-taking incident at a natural gas complex in Algeria on 19 January 2013 that resulted in numerous deaths. The Government of Libya has repeatedly conveyed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya, Tarek Mitri, its concerns about the threats posed by terrorists and

organized criminal groups to the region and to its own internal security. Like other countries in the region, Libya's borders are vast and porous, which makes effective patrolling extremely difficult.

8. In 2012, it was estimated that 18 tons of cocaine amounting to $1.25 billion transited through West Africa, a portion of which allegedly passed through the Sahel. the lack of economic opportunities, limited regional cooperation, weak security and defence sectors and porous national borders have also hampered efforts to counter the spread of illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.

9. The issue of cross-border criminal activities, such as trafficking in drugs, persons, firearms and cigarettes, terrorism and money-laundering is often linked to persons or organizations located well beyond the Sahel and even the African continent. I call upon all the concerned Member States to do their part to prevent the use of their territory for criminal activities that exploit the Sahel's weak governance and contribute to the misery of the people of the region. I urge all Member States to do their utmost to tackle drug trafficking, both at its source and at its destination points.

10. There is also a lack of government capacity to ensure the protection of basic human rights, both a root cause and a symptom of recurrent crises in the region. Human rights challenges arise from a combination of long-standing weaknesses in the rule of law, a general lack of accountability, social and gender inequities and repeated discriminatory practices against certain vulnerable groups, such as women, including less access than men to land, agricultural assets, inputs and services, and rural employment opportunities, as well as lack of participation in political life. Conflicts and widespread instability have further worsened the human rights situation and are drivers of forced displacement in the Sahel. The Malian crisis is the latest example of large-scale refugee movements, with nearly 200,000 refugees sheltering in neighbouring countries, increasing the pressure on host communities and the environment.

**Development and humanitarian challenges**

11. The Sahel is confronted with acute development and humanitarian challenges. Human development in the region is among the lowest in the world. Over the years, recurring food and nutritional crises caused by climate change, environmental degradation, drought, floods, poorly functioning markets, low agricultural productivity, poverty and conflict have seriously eroded the ability of households to withstand repeated and increasingly frequent shocks. Good rains and better harvests in 2012 notwithstanding, at least 11.4 million people in the Sahel remain food insecure. Some 5 million children under the age of five are at risk of acute malnutrition, of whom some 1.5 million are at risk of severe acute malnutrition. The prices of cereal, the staple food in the Sahel, have been increasing since October 2010 and are above the last five-year average, leading to a significant decrease in the purchasing power of vulnerable households. In addition, the Sahel faces major and recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as meningitis, polio and cholera, which present significant challenges for weak health-care systems and can be addressed only through a long-term regional approach aimed at building resilience.

12. Despite its marginal productivity, the Sahel supports some 150 million people. At current growth rates, its population is likely to balloon in the next 25 years to nearly a quarter of a billion people. Agriculture and pastoralism sustain the major portion of the population. However, traditional livelihoods alone will evidently not

be sufficient and a significant transformation will be required throughout the region. The convergence of chronic underinvestment in the agricultural and energy sectors, ineffective social protection systems, inequitable access to basic social services, such as nutrition, education, health care, water and sanitation, environmental degradation and rapid population growth will only result, without the commitment of sustained investment and cooperation in these areas, in a further deepening of vulnerability.

13. The regional climate trends observed over the past 40 years in the Sahel show that the impact of changing climatic conditions on the availability of natural resources (land and water), coupled with other magnifying factors, has led to increased competition over natural resources and tensions between communities. While migration and the movement of people and livestock are an integral part of the ancestral livelihood strategies of the Sahel, they also occur as a result of multiple climate and market shocks.

14. In particular, many families and communities do not have the capacity to safely and appropriately withstand the damaging effects of climate, poor results in the agro-pastoral sector, market fluctuations and other socioeconomic shocks facing them. Conflict further exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. The adoption of negative coping mechanisms, such as selling valuable assets, including agricultural inputs and livestock, incurring debt, migrating to urban areas, pulling children out of school and reducing the quantity and nutritional quality of purchased food leads to a vicious downward spiral of diminished coping capacity, hunger, poverty and destitution. Poverty and destitution are also among the underlying reasons why children from the region are associated with armed groups, as demonstrated by reports of cross-border recruitment of children from Burkina Faso and the Niger by armed groups operating in Mali.

**Way forward**

15. Despite the daunting multifaceted challenges facing the Sahel, the unity now demonstrated over Mali gives me confidence that the political will exists, both regionally and internationally, to address the interrelated root causes of the crisis in the region. We must take advantage of the international consensus, which was evident during the high-level meeting on the Sahel that I chaired on the margins of the general debate of the General Assembly on 26 September 2012. Working with the Governments of the region, our objective should be to bring about long-term change through a comprehensive strategy, taking into account existing efforts. This approach needs to be firmly anchored in strong resilience-building efforts as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

## III. Existing national, regional and international initiatives to address the challenges in the Sahel

16. Over the years, the countries of the Sahel region have initiated a series of national reforms aimed at addressing chronic governance, security, development and humanitarian challenges faced, although the scale of these challenges varies from country to country. Flagship programmes have been launched in a number of countries in support of these efforts. For example, in 2012, the Government of the Niger launched the Strategy for development and security in the Sahel-Saharan areas of the Niger. In 2011, it also launched the widely known 3N initiative, "les

Nigériens nourrissent les Nigériens" on food security and nutrition. The Government of Mauritania has been in the forefront of efforts to promote enhanced regional border management and, in this regard, hosted an African Union ministerial conference on security cooperation in the Sahel-Sahara region on 17 March 2013. The Government of Mauritania has also developed a food security strategy, a social protection strategy, a joint programme on nutrition and a Millennium Development Goal acceleration framework on maternal health. The Government of Burkina Faso is leading ECOWAS mediation efforts in Mali, while on the domestic front it has put in place a plan of action to address long-term food insecurity. The Government of Chad has committed itself to raising $400 million between 2012 and 2015 for rural sector transformation to build the foundation for sustained food security and, in January 2013, it provided a significant and timely contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Mali. Following an end to major hostilities, the interim Government of Mali has, for its part, developed and launched a comprehensive plan for sustainable recovery for 2013 and 2014. The plan includes pillars on infrastructure, basic social services, food security, governance and decentralization.

17. At the subregional and regional levels, the African Union and ECOWAS have developed comprehensive regional frameworks to promote development, good governance, peace and security in the region. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an AU strategic framework for pan-African socioeconomic development, with several programmes in the areas of integration and infrastructure, agriculture and food security, and climate change and national resource management. Other important frameworks include the 2008 ECOWAS Strategic Framework for Conflict Prevention, the 2011 Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa, the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy and Plan of Action (2012-2017), and the 2008-2011 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse, which was extended until the end of 2015 at the forty-second ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Côte d'Ivoire in February 2013. At the same session, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government also adopted the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism, which includes a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan.

18. In addition to the progress at the regional level in the Sahel, interregional cooperation with West Africa and the Maghreb requires greater attention, since many of the challenges faced, including environmental degradation, terrorism and organized crime, are interregional in nature. The African Union, for its part, is supporting the implementation of its 2013-2017 Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Through the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, located in Algiers, the African Union supports member States in implementing its legal framework on counter-terrorism through regional and international information-sharing, cooperation and coordination. In addition, four countries of the Sahel, namely, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, have established two mechanisms aimed at addressing transnational threats and enhancing intelligence cooperation: a common operational joint chiefs of staff committee located in Tamanrasset, Algeria, and a unified fusion and liaison cell. However, those mechanisms need to become fully operational. In addition, the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) has an important role to play in monitoring and analysing agriculture production and food prices in the region, while the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the

Community of Sahelo-Saharan States is prepared and needs support to take more action, as demonstrated in March 2013 at its most recent meeting.

19. At the international level, in March 2012, the European Union launched its strategy for security and development in the Sahel. The strategy is aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty in the region and creating conditions for economic and human development. The European Union-led Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative was officially launched on 6 December 2012 to address the causes of food insecurity in the region. On 18 March 2013, the European Union appointed a special representative for the Sahel to lead the Union's contribution to regional and international efforts to foster lasting peace, security and development in the Sahel. The European Union also authorized an assistance mission to reinforce efforts to help Libya manage its borders more effectively. A number of other actors have also appointed special envoys for the Sahel, including the African Union, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and a range of bilateral actors.

20. In 2007, the Government of the United States of America launched the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership aimed at enhancing the capacity of countries in the pan-Sahel region to tackle terrorism and facilitating cooperation between Sahel countries and Maghreb partners, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, on counter-terrorism issues. Within the framework of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Algeria and Canada co-chair the Sahel Working Group on Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building. International financial institutions have been providing direct financial assistance to the countries and have funded infrastructure development projects throughout the region. The World Bank is in the process of drafting a development strategy for Mali and the wider Sahel subregion, and the African Development Bank is working on a Sahel initiative. In addition, non-governmental organizations have been instrumental in developing policies, supporting advocacy efforts and implementing related initiatives, with a focus on the community level.

21. Following the influx of returnees to the region from Libya and the resumption of armed conflict in northern Mali, the Security Council convened a series of meetings and adopted resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), in addition to a presidential statement on 10 December 2012 (S/PRST/2012/26), to effectively address the interrelated challenges facing the Sahel. In April 2012, I appointed a regional humanitarian coordinator to develop and coordinate the humanitarian response in the region. In October 2012, I appointed Romano Prodi as my Special Envoy for the Sahel to lead the Organization's efforts to develop and implement an integrated strategy for the region. The United Nations also convened, in collaboration with Member States, a series of meetings on border management, including a meeting on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb hosted by Morocco in March 2013. Meanwhile, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, UNSMIL, continues to advise the Libyan authorities on matters relating to border security, and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and other United Nations missions in the wider region, continue to work on these issues.

22. On the ground, United Nations country teams have been active in providing support to the countries in the Sahel, in particular through the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategy papers or other national development frameworks (accelerated growth and sustainable development strategy, etc.), country-specific United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, consolidated

appeal processes and Millennium Development Goal Acceleration Frameworks to support the range of humanitarian and development concerns facing the region.

## IV. Rationale for a regional approach and United Nations principles of engagement in the Sahel

23. Based on the above analysis of the underlying causes of instability, and taking into account the efforts taken to date to address them, the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, outlined in the annex, aims to support the Governments and people of the region in their efforts to address the causes of instability within a sustainable and long-term perspective. In particular, the United Nations strategy identifies specific objectives and actions under three strategic goals, namely, (a) enhancing inclusive and effective governance throughout the region; (b) strengthening the capacity of national and regional security mechanisms to address cross-border threats; and (c) integrating development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience.

24. The political will of Governments in the region will be required to achieve the objectives and sustain the actions outlined in the United Nations integrated strategy, while ensuring coherence and complementarity with other initiatives. Acting through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, I will continue to use my good offices to foster the necessary political will and mobilize resources, building on the efforts of the United Nations country teams.

25. The multiple national security, governance, development and human rights challenges facing the countries of the Sahel have regional ramifications. Inequitable political participation and access to social services have regional dimensions, given the cross-border ties of marginalized groups. Terrorist and criminal groups act on the national, regional and international levels. The environmental and economic shocks that give rise to humanitarian crises are also regional and international in nature.

26. The challenges facing the Sahel do not respect borders and neither can the solutions. Maintaining the focus on regional cooperation, national capacity-building and information sharing will be particularly important. Ensuring proper information flow, coordination and complementarity has proven to be a major challenge for the initiatives taken to date at the regional level. A number of worthy initiatives have suffered from inadequate coordination and have failed to take into account the broader regional dimensions of the problem, partly owing to lack of trust, lack of effective regional instruments or lack of information.

27. The Governments and peoples of the region must lead the coordination process. However, the United Nations, acting through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, will also do its part to improve coordination among the following sets of actors: (a) the Governments of the region; (b) the international community, including international financial institutions; (c) the people of the region, by reaching out to them through existing United Nations civil society consultation mechanisms; and (d) the various entities of the United Nations system. Bringing together these four spheres of coordination, the United Nations system will help to integrate efforts to address

issues related to governance, security and resilience, which constitute the three overarching goals of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

28. Fostering coordination among the Governments of the region is a top priority. Continuing to build trust and confidence among the countries of the Sahel will be a cross-cutting objective of the United Nations integrated strategy, which aims to improve governance structures in the region in a manner that legitimately elected Governments are able to sustain and build upon, with as little dependency as possible on international assistance.

29. Coordination within the broader international community will be important to make optimal use of the limited resources available in the current global economic climate. In this regard, collaboration with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, the African Union and the European Union, in addition to international financial institutions, bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations, will be important in order to generate, sustain and coordinate international engagement in support of the national efforts by Sahelian countries to address the multifaceted challenges they face.

30. The people of the region must be heard and made part of any solution affecting their lives. Consultations with the people of the region will be based on existing United Nations mechanisms and will include civil society, tribal and religious leaders, representatives of academia and think tanks and women and young people, with particular attention to the marginalized.

31. The United Nations integrated strategy is designed to foster system-wide unity of purpose and to provide a basis for coherent United Nations engagement in the Sahel. It envisages a range of innovative actions related to, inter alia, the enhancement of regional security analysis and regional capacity to manage borders, the strengthening of local government and State capacity to distribute resources more equitably, the provision of support to vulnerable households and the enhancement of food and nutritional security.

32. The United Nations integrated strategy seeks to enable a multisectoral approach to the problems of the region and to ensure that the design and implementation of actions bring together the strengths and capacities of the various entities of the United Nations system. It also seeks to build, strengthen and further integrate national capacity-building initiatives into the wider development and security efforts, taking into account the policies, priorities and needs of each of the countries in the Sahel. Moreover, the integrated nature of the strategy means that it will be based on joint analysis of cross-cutting issues throughout the Sahel, drawing on inputs and data from all the countries in the region. The integrated strategy is designed to facilitate the prioritization and sequencing of efforts, so that achievements in a given area reinforce implementation in other areas. It also allows for common reporting and analysis on how each area of action affects the others. An integrated approach will also facilitate the development of common messaging and advocacy.

33. The following principles will guide the engagement of the United Nations in the Sahel:

(a) Focus on regional-level interventions and cross-border issues and threats, allowing for coherence and coordination among short-term, medium-term and long-term measures;

(b) Anchor regional United Nations engagement in national ownership and accountability and ensure that it is grounded in international human rights standards and principles;

(c) Promote the integration of regional priorities into national planning and programming to ensure coherence and mutually reinforcing action across the region;

(d) Promote an equitable approach to development in order to accelerate achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and support social cohesion and conflict prevention;

(e) Maximize the impact of the United Nations system in addressing the continuing challenges of the region and focus on areas in which the United Nations has, or can have, added value to address crises, while building on existing initiatives and continuing efforts;

(f) Ensure free, active and meaningful participation of people and communities at risk throughout all programming phases, including needs assessments and the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes;

(g) Promote cooperation and coordination among national, regional, subregional and international partners, strengthening partnerships with regional and subregional institutions and stakeholders within their respective mandates and reaching out to new potential partners;

(h) Ensure that gender concerns are included in all regional and national efforts targeting the Sahel, including through free, active and meaningful participation of women and their organizations in decision-making;

(i) Encourage South-South cooperation and sharing of best practices among the countries of the Sahel.

## V. Activities of the Special Envoy for the Sahel

34. Since his appointment, my Special Envoy has started to foster the close coordination we need. He has undertaken considerable consultations with key actors working in or on the Sahel. He has visited the region on several occasions, along with my Special Representative for West Africa, and has met Heads of State, government officials and civil society actors in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, in addition to the Chair of ECOWAS in Côte d'Ivoire. He has held consultations with the African Union, its High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and the ECOWAS Commission. He also visited Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

35. My Special Envoy has placed a strong emphasis on the need for regional development in the Sahel and, to that end, has visited a number of key international partners, including China, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and has maintained close contact with them. On 7 December 2012, he convened the first-ever coordination meeting with special envoys and mediators for the Sahel. He has engaged regularly with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West

Africa, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel, resident coordinators and United Nations country teams in the region.

36. During his visits to the region, my Special Envoy has held meetings with civil society representatives, including women. In April 2013, together with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Acting Head of UN-Women, my Special Envoy hosted a conference on women's leadership in the Sahel, looking at issues involving women as economic and political drivers of change, in addition to the role of women in conflict mediation. He will continue these consultations with the support of the respective Governments of the region with the aim of facilitating more inclusive governance processes.

37. On 1 March 2013, my Special Envoy co-hosted, with my Special Adviser on the Millennium Development Goals, a seminar in Dakar that brought together local academics, experts and representatives of United Nations agencies and international financial institutions to discuss and identify innovative approaches to fundamental development issues facing the region.

38. The United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and bilateral donors have developed strategies to support peace and development in the Sahel. Key partners have encouraged my Special Envoy to support the establishment of a mechanism to enhance coordination among these actors, prioritize actions and mobilize resources, particularly for key regional infrastructure projects that can kick-start growth quickly and effectively, drive regional integration and create employment, especially for youth. To maximize the impact of our collective efforts in this area, I propose that emphasis be placed on the core Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger.

39. Based on the elements outlined above, my Special Envoy's proposal for a Sahel-owned development plan would include two platforms: a coordination platform and an action fund platform. The coordination platform would focus mainly on regularly updating regional infrastructure priorities, identified through a bottom-up process involving local academics and experts and coordinated by my Special Envoy, in key areas such as agriculture, water management, integrated infrastructure, including telecommunications, solar energy and health care and education. The platform would enable the main multilateral donors to meet every six months to review their strategies, ensure that needs are met and overlap avoided. They would meet with countries concerned to discuss priorities and ensure that the donors and recipient countries agree on priorities for resource mobilization. The inaugural coordination platform meeting could take place on the margins of the General Assembly in September 2013.

40. The funding platform would act as a "clearing house" for the identified regional infrastructure priorities in order to effectively match needs with available resources. Donors would be encouraged to provide support, either financially or in-kind, for the agreed and vetted regional priorities, which would be updated regularly by the above-mentioned coordination platform. In order to facilitate the necessary resource mobilization, my Special Envoy proposes the establishment of a Sahel action fund, which could be managed by a pool of international financial institutions. The fund would aim to attract bilateral and multilateral financial support, while also tracking in-kind contributions and encouraging in-kind

contributors to align their support with the identified regional infrastructure priorities.

41. In keeping with the principle of national ownership, countries in the region will be asked to identify and detail their regional infrastructure priorities. To that end, on 14 June 2013, my Special Envoy convened a follow-up meeting of academics from the Sahel in Bologna, Italy. The meeting constitutes the first step in a process that will allow regional infrastructure priorities to be further developed and refined. Based on the results of the Bologna meeting, my Special Envoy intends to convene the Finance and Planning Ministers of the countries of the Sahel region to review and validate the identified regional infrastructure priorities. To support this bottom-up planning process, my Special Envoy proposes that a small, specialized regional "Sahel Development Research Institute" be established with financing from the action fund.

42. In order to encourage resource mobilization, my Special Envoy will convene another meeting of special envoys for the Sahel to consider the regional infrastructure priorities validated by the Finance and Planning Ministers from the region. He will also continue his discussions with the leadership of the African Development Bank to explore whether, with support from the World Bank, it could lead a pool of international development institutions, including the Islamic Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, to manage the proposed Sahel action fund.

## VI. Observations and recommendations

43. The security environment in the Sahel remains fragile. The threat of terrorism, trafficking and organized crime requires a comprehensive response. Our collective focus needs to be simultaneously on security, diplomacy and development, taking subregional and regional threats and opportunities into consideration, including relations with West Africa and the Maghreb. Business as usual is not an option.

44. Given the situation in Mali and the implications for the Sahel, we must target the needs of future generations while more urgently dealing with the pressing needs of the present one. We must promote the political and economic inclusion of marginalized groups, particularly in the border areas. We must develop a comprehensive approach to extremism and criminality, in line with international human rights norms and standards, focused on providing opportunities for young people and other risk groups such as prisoners, giving a voice to women and fighting corruption.

45. Past initiatives aimed at resolving crises and conflict in the Sahel have focused largely on the national level and shown their limits, given the cross-border nature and regional scope of the complex challenges confronting the region. Going forward, the United Nations will need to link national efforts and initiatives to region-wide approaches more effectively. The United Nations integrated strategy is intended to guide the Organization's efforts to collectively support the efforts of the countries of the Sahel to address those challenges from a regional perspective, while adhering to the principle of national ownership. The approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian, development and security interventions in order to ensure that lifesaving activities meet immediate needs, while building the resilience

of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

46. The United Nations integrated strategy builds on existing analyses and recommendations, including the United Nations inter-agency assessment mission to the Sahel conducted in December 2011 with the participation of the African Union, the conclusions of the meeting between the African Union and United Nations experts on the Sahel held in Addis Ababa on 14 and 15 March 2012 (endorsed by the ministerial-level meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held on 20 March 2012 in Bamako), and the United Nations action plan on resilience-building in the Sahel. It is geared towards complementing initiatives and measures taken by the States of the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, in addition to regional entities, including the African Union, ECOWAS, the Arab Maghreb Union and CEN-SAD. The proposed strategy is a living document that will be continuously modified, adapted and adjusted as its implementation progresses and the circumstances on the ground evolve.

47. In implementing the integrated strategy for the Sahel, the United Nations will seek to leverage its comparative advantage based on its long-standing presence in the region and its experience in addressing some of the most acute problems facing the populations concerned. The Organization will draw upon its good offices to facilitate and coordinate the convening of relevant actors to help tackle some of the critical issues as well as support resource mobilization and advocacy efforts. The United Nations alone cannot, however, successfully take on the tremendous challenges facing the Sahel. The countries of the region have to maintain their leadership and ownership of the process. The effectiveness of the strategy must be enhanced through partnerships with other interested major actors in the region, such as the African Union and ECOWAS, international financial institutions, and multilateral and bilateral partners, whose technical and financial assistance will be key to the success of this coordinated approach.

48. Effective regional cooperation among Sahelian countries requires continued engagement. I will continue to use my good offices, including through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, to help build mutual trust among the States in the Sahel.

49. Nowhere is the development-security nexus more evident than in the Sahel. Only through strong, common and preventative actions geared primarily towards development can we prevent the Sahel from turning into an area dominated by criminal and terrorist groups that undermine our collective security. Regional security, regional development cooperation and greater regional integration are essential, and should go hand-in-hand with one another. We must therefore focus on strengthening regional mechanisms across all sectors and promote integrated and comprehensive national strategies for dealing with terrorism and transnational organized crime that complement these mechanisms. For this reason, the United Nations integrated strategy will be implemented in close cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, CILSS, the Arab-Maghreb Union and other relevant subregional actors.

50. Building upon national programmes already in place in a number of countries, actions are urgently needed to support inclusive resilience-building. In the short term, humanitarian action will continue to provide lifesaving assistance and address

most of the acute needs. In the medium term, and through a mixture of humanitarian and development assistance, disaster risk reduction and development interventions will aim to rebuild assets, support livelihoods, scale up social protection and provide access to basic services, without any form of discrimination. In the long term, it will be important to consolidate the gains achieved through short-term and medium-term interventions to achieve peace, sustainable growth and human development. In this respect, resilience is also about preventive action.

51. The United Nations strategy needs to be bottom-up and participatory, with clear government leadership, ownership and accountability, including through the allocation of funds. It must ensure that short-, medium- and long-term efforts are captured in integrated, multiyear programming of humanitarian and development assistance in order to respond to immediate needs and reinforce the capacities, livelihoods and opportunities of the most vulnerable people in the long run. Evaluation of the risks to which a community or country may be exposed is also necessary.

52. The implementation of the strategy will require the sustained engagement by the United Nations system as a whole over a period of years. In order to maximize its impact on the ground, its implementation should rest on the strong engagement of UNOWA and the United Nations system in the region. Over time, it should result in a regionally owned implementation mechanism. The strategy must also be reviewed and refined on a continuous basis, through consultation and cooperation with the countries of the region and the international community.

53. In order to deliver on this ambitious agenda, the United Nations will undertake a review of the available resources at the global, regional and country levels currently being marshalled in support of the Sahel to determine how best to focus its support. The United Nations Development Group regional team in Dakar will receive further capacity to pursue this agenda for the region. Building on existing efforts, the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks for the region will be used as the instrument to advance the strategy at the country level. Regional capacity on early warning throughout the Sahel will be strengthened under the lead role of the United Nations Office for West Africa, with the support of all United Nations entities involved in the implementation of the strategy.

54. The implementation of agreed regional infrastructure priorities will be key to driving human and economic development and will directly complement the roll-out of the United Nations integrated strategy. To that end, the proposed establishment of a coordination platform will help to ensure that the efforts of the international community are aligned with the regional needs identified through a bottom-up process. This will help ensure that a coherent and coordinated approach is pursued in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. My Special Envoy will continue to engage with the international financial institutions and with the World Bank and African Development Bank to explore the possibility of establishing a Sahel action fund for regional infrastructure capable of tracking and channelling both financial and in-kind contributions.

55. I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, and his staff for their efforts to contribute to sustainable peace and development of the Sahel region. I would also like to note the efforts of the United Nations offices throughout the Sahel region for their continued commitment.

# Annex

## United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel

The United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel is built around three broad areas of support formulated as strategic goals and organized according to key themes. The strategic goals are aimed at supporting and strengthening continuing initiatives and addressing previously identified gaps. A series of specific objectives and indicative actions are proposed to achieve these goals. The three areas of support are complementary and form an integrated response to the Sahel crisis. In particular, the approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian and development interventions, ensuring that lifesaving activities meet immediate needs while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda.

### Strategic goal one: inclusive and effective governance throughout the region is enhanced

Effective governance rests on State legitimacy, based on: political inclusion; the rule of law; State capacity to deliver basic services; and accountability in delivering such services. United Nations good offices are focused in part on helping countries of the region to attain State legitimacy when and where required, and the programmatic activities of the system are geared to building the needed capacity and accountability mechanisms. Good governance, including in the security sector, is an essential element of United Nations programming, as reflected in the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and poverty reduction strategy papers or national development frameworks. The goal of effective and inclusive governance can be broken down into the following objectives and indicative actions:

**Objective 1.1**
**Strengthen institutions to foster democratic practices, including political dialogue, free, fair and transparent elections, and broad-based participation**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support programmes aimed at empowering political parties in Sahelian countries to promote peaceful politics and the political participation of women, including through the establishment of inclusive inter-party dialogue frameworks (Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women));

(b) Promote the exchange of knowledge and the sharing of experiences among electoral management bodies in the Sahel on issues pertaining to the prevention of election-related conflicts, including gender-based violence (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, UN-Women);

(c) Support the establishment of national early warning mechanisms to prevent, respond to and mitigate potential conflict throughout the electoral process (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP);

(d) Foster the active, meaningful and free participation of civil society members, including young people, women and minority groups, and the media, in the political life of the respective countries (UNDP, UN-Women);

(e) Support the development of programmes to build the capacity and oversight functions of parliaments and enhance the capacity of parliamentary committees (UNDP);

(f) Promote greater participation of women from the Sahel region in all international forums and peace talks to resolve the crises in the Sahel, building on the European Union/United Nations high-level conference on women's leadership in the Sahel, held on 9 April 2013, and on other relevant international and regional frameworks (UN-Women, Department of Political Affairs);

(g) Build the capacity of governmental and non-governmental national and regional actors, including regional economic communities, on issues relating to facilitation, dialogue and mediation, to foster peace and reconciliation, manage political risks and promote collaborative processes (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, UN-Women).

**Objective 1.2**
**Support local governance and the extension of government services throughout national territories**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Promote and support the drafting and implementation of legislation on decentralization and deconcentration in the Sahelian countries (UNDP);

(b) Build the capacities and accountability mechanisms of national and local institutions to deliver quality basic social services, which include health care, education, water and sanitation, promote equitable access to such services and enhance resilience at the local level (United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA));

(c) Build the capacity of local authorities and institutions to establish and implement mechanisms for broader and more inclusive participation of the community and vulnerable groups, including women, in local development (UNDP, UNICEF, UN-Women).

**Objective 1.3**
**Strengthen State capacities to ensure more equitable access to resources and socioeconomic services**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the development and enhancement of policies and practices aimed at improving public sector resource management, allocation and accountability, including independent oversight (UNDP);

(b) Strengthen the capacity of Governments and other relevant stakeholders to harness natural resources to advance human development in four interdependent areas: participatory legislation, policy and planning; people-centred exploration; effective revenue collection and management; and investing in human development and structural transformation (UNDP).

**Objective 1.4**
**Assist the Sahelian countries to strengthen regional mechanisms for economic governance**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Develop the capacity of regional economic communities and support their regional action plans to ensure ownership among countries in the implementation of public finance reforms, in order to reinforce results-based management and accelerate regional integration (UNDP, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA));

(b) Support, at the regional level, the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)).

**Objective 1.5**
**Strengthen national and regional human rights mechanisms to combat impunity and assist the Sahelian countries to strengthen independent national justice systems to effectively address corruption**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Promote the ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights instruments as well as the use of such regional human rights mechanisms as the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR));

(b) Establish a regional platform to share experiences, discuss common challenges and define common regional priorities of parliamentary committees in the Sahel (UNDP, United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA));

(c) Support the establishment of national human rights institutions in conformity with international standards and help to establish a network of such institutions for the Sahel (OHCHR);

(d) Help to design and support truth-seeking processes, national consultations on transitional justice, judicial accountability mechanisms, reparation programmes, including for victims of sexual violence, and provide advice on relevant institutional reforms (OHCHR, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP);

(e) Support the countries of the region to put in place appropriate anti-corruption legislation and action plans in accordance with international and regional conventions (the United Nations Convention against Corruption, African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption and ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption); and strengthen the capacity and functioning of national anti-corruption commissions to better prevent, detect and fight corruption (UNDP, UNODC);

(f) Support the strengthening of internal and external oversight, as well as integrity safeguard mechanisms, for law enforcement and judicial personnel (UNODC).

**Objective 1.6**
**Support community security and social cohesion**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the development of a community security and social cohesion strategy, through participatory and inclusive dialogue, for Sahel countries (UNDP, UNOWA, UNODC);

(b) Enhance community security, social cohesion and the provision of judicial services at the local level, including police stations, courts, legal aid and correction facilities, for easy access to responsive, accountable and effective security and judicial services (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP, UN-Women).

**Objective 1.7**
**Assist the Sahelian countries to develop national and regional early warning systems to address potential governance challenges and security threats**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support Governments, ECOWAS and other regional entities in enhancing existing early warning mechanisms, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), and promoting linkages among them and in strengthening their analytical capacities (UNOWA, UNDP);

(b) Promote regional dialogue among traditional and community leaders and leaders of faith-based organizations to address, inter alia, recruitment by extremist groups and promote the establishment of community-based conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms (Department of Political Affairs, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(c) Support increased participation of young people, women and gender experts in peace talks, negotiations of peace agreements and efforts at national reconciliation (UNOWA, UNDP, UN-Women).

**Objective 1.8**
**Foster sustainable security sector governance in the Sahelian countries through the promotion of and support to professional, accountable and regulated security and justice institutions**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Build the capacity of national and regional institutions to enhance security sector governance in the Sahel through: (i) supporting the creation of a coordinating framework to link national, regional and international efforts in the area of security sector reform; (ii) supporting existing national initiatives on security sector reform and, especially, defence sector reform with strategic and technical assistance (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);

(b) Enhance and expand the activities of existing joint subregional forums to facilitate the exchange of lessons, best practices and information on security and defence governance matters in West Africa, including by supporting efforts by ECOWAS to finalize and implement its subregional security sector governance policy framework and action plan (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations).

## Strategic goal two: national and regional security mechanisms are capable of addressing cross-border threats

National, subregional and regional security mechanisms, grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, need to be strengthened and made fully operational. The countries of the region, in response to the crisis in Mali, have taken initial steps towards greater cooperation, including in information-sharing. The African Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD have played important roles in this area. It is important to build upon these efforts, both to foster trust among the countries whose cooperation is vital and to strengthen their capacity to address cross-border threats. United Nations entities such as UNOWA, UNODC, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the 1267 Monitoring Team and OHCHR undertake important initiatives in these areas. In addition, in tackling the current crisis in the Sahel, it is crucial for the United Nations family to align its various initiatives in a comprehensive and integrated manner, ensuring that they are grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, given the prevalence of illicit trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism in the region — serious problems that do not always receive sufficient attention. Key objectives and indicative actions include:

**Objective 2.1**
**Enhance United Nations regional security analysis and monitoring of cross-border threats in the Sahel**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Building upon existing mapping of security measures and mechanisms, including the report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region (S/2012/42, annex) and detailed mapping exercises that have already been undertaken by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations system will collaboratively identify gaps in existing frameworks aimed at combating transnational organized crime and terrorism. It will also step up its efforts to raise the awareness of national stakeholders of the available strategies and technologies, with a view to making optimum use of resources (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, UNODC, UNOWA);

(b) In fulfilment of its preventive diplomacy mandate, UNOWA will work with the rest of the United Nations system to strengthen its analytical capacity and improve information-sharing within the United Nations system in the subregion. As part of this effort, a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) liaison officer, based in UNOWA, will collaborate with Department of Safety and Security analysts in the region, the 1267 Monitoring Team and other relevant United Nations personnel, such as the peace and development advisers, in support of the analytical capacity of UNOWA (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Safety and Security).

**Objective 2.2**
**Enhance national capacity, including through improved coordination among relevant national institutions, to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime, in line with international human rights standards**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) An important step towards more effective border management in the region is to ensure a more coordinated and coherent approach at the national level. Security sector agencies will need to integrate and coordinate their border management activities. By way of response, the United Nations counter-terrorism entities (the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA and UNODC will lead United Nations efforts in supporting the countries of the region to establish coordinating mechanisms to combat terrorism and organized crime, so that police, border guards, the army, customs and national security advisers can work together in a manner that is coherent and compliant with human rights standards and the rule of law. A mechanism for sharing information among coordinating mechanisms in neighbouring countries will also be established. It is expected that in 2013, an initial project in the Sahel will be piloted in Burkina Faso by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, in collaboration with relevant United Nations entities, under the Task Force's Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) Initiative. Once other projects in the region have been initiated, efforts will be made to establish a regional network that would contribute to the building of an effective regional early warning mechanism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA, UNODC);

(b) Use the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force as a coordination platform for the United Nations counter-terrorism entities in providing country-focused solutions for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Sahel, including pillar IV on respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, UNOWA);

(c) Strengthen efforts to facilitate the delivery of technical counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance for police, prosecutors and the judiciary in the Sahelian countries, within the framework of respect for human rights (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNDP, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);

(d) Support the upgrading of the curriculums of law enforcement and judicial training institutions and improve skills and techniques pertaining to in-depth investigations, in line with international human rights laws and rule of law standards. This includes improving cooperation between law enforcement and justice institutions. Special emphasis would be placed on drug and arms trafficking, trafficking in human beings, terrorist activities and financial investigations (UNODC);

(e) Further improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement and judicial response to money-laundering and financial crime. This will require all authorities concerned to systematically pursue an asset-oriented approach when investigating or prosecuting cases relating to illicit trafficking or terrorism, to actively engage with

their country's financial intelligence unit, and to further develop or strengthen national regimes on the identification, seizure, confiscation and management of proceeds of crime (UNODC).

**Objective 2.3**
**Enhance national capacities for effective border management, including through improved coordination among relevant national institutions**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Promote the development of national integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that include a border security component (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Support the development of customs information-sharing and analysis units for effective border control (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force);

(c) Support the implementation or enhancement of automated data management systems at border crossings with links to national and international alert databases for the purpose of detecting and preventing the cross-border movement of terrorists and other criminals (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force);

(d) Raise awareness among and train front-line customs officials on the detection and prevention of the illicit movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and to combat drugs and arms trafficking (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNODC);

(e) Provide advice to the Governments of the region on developing effective border management strategies, in line with international human rights standards, including best practice modalities for coordinated border controls by relevant agencies at the national level and with neighbouring States for addressing illicit trafficking and cross-border movements of criminals, including terrorists, and the scaling up of border management capacity in so-called "hub cities" through which large quantities of illicit goods transit (UNODC, UNOWA).

**Objective 2.4**
**Strengthen regional capacity to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the African Union in the implementation of the conclusions of the meeting on security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Sahara region, held in Mauritania on 17 March 2013 (UNOWA, UNODC, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Provide technical assistance and support the implementation of the 2008-2015 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa (UNODC, UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);

(c) Support regional and subregional organizations and their mechanisms, such as the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, to enable enhanced sharing of information and best practices (UNOWA, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate).

**Objective 2.5**
**Enhance regional and interregional cooperation among Sahelian, West African and Maghreb States, including through the development of harmonized approaches aimed at combating illicit trafficking, controlling arms and movements of armed and criminal elements, including terrorists, and reinforcing the 1267 arms embargo mandate**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Strengthen existing subregional judicial cooperation mechanisms, notably the Regional Judicial Platform of Sahel countries and the Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors in West Africa, especially with regard to the drafting and processing of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests, in line with international human rights law and rule of law standards (UNODC, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Sensitize the Governments of the Sahel and civil society actors about the 2012 International Small Arms Control Standards developed under the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism, which provide clear guidance on putting in place and maintaining controls on small arms and light weapons. Efforts will also be made to support the countries of the region to fully implement the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials (Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism);

(c) Building on the conclusions of the conference of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force-United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb, held in Rabat from 13 to 15 March 2013, facilitate the convening of annual meetings of border control and security officials (customs, border police and intelligence officials) of the concerned States, with a view to developing expert networks and strengthening information exchange and border control cooperation in a manner that is human rights compliant (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 1267 Monitoring Team);

(d) Support the establishment of bilateral or multilateral agreements, memorandums of understanding or other arrangements to enable cooperation and coordination of border control efforts in West Africa and the Sahel (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA);

(e) Sustain an up-to-date sanctions regime on Al-Qaida and affiliates under the 1267 regime (Security Council resolution 2083 (2012)). This will include a regional meeting of intelligence services to exchange information on the threat from Al-Qaida and affiliates and to update information relevant to the 1267 targeted sanctions regime (1267 Monitoring Team);

(f) Support efforts to improve communication and exchange of intelligence, in line with international human rights standards, among airports in Latin America, West Africa, the Sahel, the Maghreb and Europe, in order to tackle illicit trafficking

at source, transit and destination points, including by enforcing relevant travel bans (UNODC);

(g) Improve coordination among concerned States to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property and protect Mali's ancient manuscripts and other types of protected movable cultural heritage, in accordance with the provisions of the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in particular its article 9, and the 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) (UNESCO, MINUSMA).

## Strategic goal three: humanitarian and development plans and interventions are integrated to build long-term resilience

Multisectoral approaches build the resilience of the Sahelian people by bridging humanitarian and development programming with the aim of addressing underlying causes and subsequent consequences of food and nutrition insecurity and other vulnerabilities and promoting long-term development. Coherent, mutually reinforcing and harmonized planning and implementation through humanitarian and development activities will help to deliver a successful resilience package to the most vulnerable communities. Food and nutritional security will remain at the centre of the resilience strategy. Central to this effort are the following objectives and indicative actions:

**Objective 3.1**
**Support local, national and regional stakeholders to better identify and track vulnerable households, in a participatory manner**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Ensure effective national and regional disaggregated data collection and information management to enable better identification and tracking of vulnerable populations (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, UNFPA);

(b) Support mechanisms and networks in the region (Cadre harmonisé bonifié, Dispositif régional de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (PREGEC), Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA)) in delivering quality and timely food security and nutrition information and analysis to effectively guide decision-making and mobilize preventative and early action (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP, UNICEF).

**Objective 3.2**
**Support Governments and other stakeholders to provide equitable and effective coverage of basic social services and promote effective social protection systems**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the development of effective monitoring systems (UNICEF);

(b) Ensure that vulnerable populations have access to adequate and inclusive basic social services without discrimination, social protection and safety nets, as the basis of building and protecting human capital and assets and reducing the vulnerability of households to internal and external shocks (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP);

(c) Support the development and implementation of comprehensive national social protection policies and laws and corresponding institutional and budgetary frameworks, in line with national and international human rights standards (UNDP, UN-Women, UNICEF, International Labour Organization (ILO));

(d) Support the development and implementation of policies, strategies and budgetary frameworks specific to nutrition (UNICEF, WHO, WFP, FAO);

(e) Ensure that communities are provided with information on the availability of basic services; facilitate community participation in the identification of constraints and the design of local solutions that improve community resilience; and reinforce the ability of communities to demand basic services (UNICEF, International Organization for Migration (IOM), WFP).

**Objective 3.3**
**Strengthen household, national and regional risk management capacities**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support regional-level initiatives and cooperation on disaster risk reduction and management (UNDP, UNESCO, WFP);

(b) Strengthen and promote participatory risk management capacities at the local, national and regional levels (UNDP, UN-Women, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, IOM, WFP);

(c) Support the establishment of national and regional food security stocks, with the aim of regulating markets and covering transient food needs (WFP);

(d) Reinforce national and regional humanitarian supply mechanisms for timely and effective response delivery (UNICEF, WFP, IOM);

(e) Support behaviour change communication strategies to promote individual and societal changes leading to the adoption of practices that strengthen individual and family resilience, including through the promotion of better nutrition (UN-Women, UNICEF, UNFPA);

(f) Map and encourage the use of indigenous knowledge to inform early warning systems; strengthen networks of vulnerable groups around advocacy issues identified through the participatory vulnerability analysis (UNESCO).

**Objective 3.4**
**Strengthen sustainable livelihoods**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Map livelihoods and the capacities of economic actors at the national level and provide support to sustainable livelihoods and the creation of employment, including sustainable jobs, with just and favourable conditions of work (UNDP, ILO, FAO);

(b) Protect productive capacities of populations by supporting the development of programmes that have a bearing on nutrition, including in the sectors of agriculture and food security, poverty reduction and development, public health, education and social protection (UNICEF, FAO, WFP, World Health Organization (WHO));

(c) Provide enhanced agricultural and pastoral livelihood opportunities through increased investment, the use of resistant seeds and species, rural extension services and new infrastructure (FAO, WFP, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD));

(d) Strengthen small farmers' links to the private sector by facilitating access to inputs, improving access to markets and strengthening value chain systems (FAO, IFAD, WFP);

(e) Support land ownership rights and responsibilities at the local and national levels (FAO, IOM);

(f) Promote alternative livelihoods through the development of value chains, the promotion of food processing and micro-enterprises, access to rural microcredit, vocational training, the promotion of regional trade and access to sustainable energy, including solar energy and green jobs (UNDP, FAO, UNESCO, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ILO);

(g) Promote and support employment schemes linked to maintaining, rehabilitating and improving essential infrastructure and productive assets (ILO, WFP, FAO);

(h) Support and protect farmers by ensuring access to reliable rural microcredit facilities, crop insurance schemes and other financial services (WFP, FAO, United Nations Capital Development Fund);

(i) Support the mapping of local knowledge of livelihoods and local coping and resilience-enhancing mechanisms (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, WFP).

**Objective 3.5**
**Promote environmental sustainability through national and regional natural resource management mechanisms and climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes, with a special focus on water**

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the systematic integration of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability policies and programmes with legal frameworks that encourage the preservation of ecosystems, land use and territorial planning, with an emphasis on ecologically integrated approaches (UNDP, UNEP);

(b) Provide technical assistance to and strengthen the capacity of the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel and other subregional bodies on regional natural resource management (FAO, UNEP, UNDP);

(c) Scale up farmer-based management of natural resources, livestock and other productive activities (FAO, WFP, IFAD);

(d) Strengthen water and land management mechanisms and provide technical assistance and capacity-building to the Niger Basin Authority, Senegal River Basin Organization and Lake Chad Basin Commission (UNEP, UNESCO).

United Nations S/2013/355

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2013

Original: English

## Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established by Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Major General Jean Bosco Kazura (Rwanda) as Force Commander of MINUSMA. Major General Kazura will assume command on 1 July 2013, when, in accordance with resolution 2100 (2013) and subject to review by the Council, the authority is scheduled to be transferred from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali to MINUSMA.

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2013/356

# Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2013

Original: English

## Letter dated 14 June 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 June 2013 (S/2013/355) concerning your intention to appoint Major General Jean Bosco Kazura (Rwanda) as Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2013/357

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 June 2013

Original: English

# Thirty-fifth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999)

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and covers developments pertaining to the issues of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including its national archives, since the issuance of my previous report, dated 14 December 2012 (S/2012/931).

2. Following the High-level Coordinator's briefing to the Security Council on 18 December 2012, the Council did not come to a decision on a way forward on the mandate set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), nor did it agree to extend financing of the activities to implement the mandate.

3. In my letter to the Security Council dated 10 January 2013 (S/2013/13), I stressed my commitment to the implementation of the mandate. I noted that until such time as the Council reached an agreement on a way forward that would permit the use of funds from the escrow account, I would draw on existing staff and resources in an ad hoc manner to undertake activities aimed at fulfilling the mandate in paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999).

4. Subsequently, on 4 February 2013, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs informed both the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, Mansour Alotaibi, and the then Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, Hamid Al Bayati, of the decision to assign Victor Poliakov, Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs, to temporarily and technically follow the dossier of the High-level Coordinator. The Senior Political Affairs Officer was tasked with visiting Kuwait and Iraq to meet with officials and ascertain the latest developments with regard to the issues relevant to the mandate.

## II. Recent activities with regard to the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, or their remains

5. The period under review was marked by the completion of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary maintenance project pursuant to Security Council resolution 833 (1993) and substantial progress towards the settlement of the matter concerning the Iraqi private citizens and their assets that remained on Kuwaiti territory following the

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demarcation of the international boundary, as referred to in Security Council resolution 899 (1994). While those developments were not directly linked to the humanitarian issues outlined in paragraph 14 of Council resolution 1284 (1999), they constituted important confidence-building steps towards the further normalization of bilateral relations between Iraq and Kuwait.

6. Against this positive background and with a view to exercising his temporary responsibilities for the dossier of the High-level Coordinator, the Senior Political Affairs Officer visited Kuwait from 5 to 7 March and Kuwait and Iraq from 24 to 30 April. In Iraq, he was received by Hamid Ahmed, Acting Chief of Staff of the Office of the Prime Minister. He also met with Mohammed Shyaa Al-Sudani, Minister of Human Rights; Mohammed Hamoud, Ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for Iraq-Kuwait issues; and members of the diplomatic corps in Baghdad. On the sidelines of the seventy-ninth session of the Technical Subcommittee of the Tripartite Commission, held in Kuwait, as well as in the course of his visit to Iraq, the Senior Political Affairs Officer met with Arkan Saleh, Deputy Minister of Human Rights and Head of the Iraqi delegation to the Technical Subcommittee.

7. In Baghdad, the Minister of Human Rights noted the importance that Iraq attached to the humanitarian issue of finding and repatriating the remains of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. Iraqi officials emphasized that the Prime Minister had made it clear that no effort should be spared to that end, a message that the Acting Chief of Staff had asked the Senior Political Affairs Officer to convey to the latter's interlocutors in Kuwait. In discussions with Iraqi interlocutors, the Senior Political Affairs Officer noted that carrying out field operations aimed at finding the remains of the Kuwaiti missing persons in the next few weeks would be essential in further building trust between Iraq and Kuwait and improving the chances for the two countries to arrive at a mutually acceptable modality for the future of the mandate.

8. Mr. Saleh provided the Senior Political Affairs Officer with a comprehensive list of Iraqi field operations in 2013 aimed at locating mass graves containing the remains of missing Kuwaiti nationals. From 16 to 22 March 2013, the Iraqi team surveyed the Khamisiyah site in Dhi Qar Governorate, where 14 burial sites were identified. Excavations are to occur in the second half of 2013. In the beginning of June, the Senior Political Affairs Officer was informed by the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations that excavations had started at the Khamisiyah site on 25 May.

9. In April 2013, a specialized team of the Ministry of Human Rights of Iraq began surveying and excavating at a site in Wasit Governorate. On 3 April, excavations started at four mass grave sites, but it became apparent that those did not contain the remains of Kuwaiti missing persons. Military uniforms found in the graves indicated that they belonged to Iraqi soldiers. Nevertheless, samples were taken and sent to the National Forensics Institute of Iraq for analysis. From 5 to 10 April, possible burial sites were explored, surveyed and excavated in Samawa, Muthanna Governorate, but no skeletal material was found. The planned excavations in Salman Pak, 15 km south of Baghdad, were postponed for security reasons. At one location traces of chemical contamination had reportedly been found, and additional analyses were needed to obtain clearance before further work could be conducted.

10. During the visit of the Senior Political Affairs Officer, the Minister of Human Rights noted that Iraq would continue its work regarding the missing Kuwaiti persons as long as it was needed and that a lack of quality information about the location of mass graves containing their remains was hampering the search. Other Iraqi interlocutors added that witnesses had gone overseas, did not want to or feel safe to cooperate, and at times were evasive (e.g. asking for more money, switching off phones) when the moment came to debrief them.

11. Iraqi officials stressed that while Iraq was committed to finding the remains of the missing Kuwaiti persons and had shown goodwill and determination to that end by conducting extensive field operations, the continuation of this mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations was not conducive to restoring the country's international standing prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 661 (1990).

12. In Kuwait, the Senior Political Affairs Officer was received by Mohammed Abdulla Abulhasan, Adviser in the Amiri Diwan; and Khalid Mohammed Al-Maqamis, Director, Coordination and Follow-up Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He met with Ali Al-Mumin, Ambassador of Kuwait to Iraq; the Chairman and the members of the National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs; and members of the diplomatic corps, including Mohammed Hussein Mohammed Bahr Aluloom, Ambassador of Iraq to Kuwait.

13. The Chairman and the members of the National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs summarized for the Senior Political Affairs Officer the outcome of the seventy-ninth session of the Technical Subcommittee, held in Kuwait on 25 April. At the session, discussions focused on the Iraqi missions to Khamisiyah with a view to preparing for excavations. It was proposed that search activities be increased in the Karbala and Samawa areas, which were visited by the Kuwaiti technical teams in 2003 and 2004 and where the remains of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals had been unearthed. The members of the National Committee reiterated the importance of receiving from the United States of America satellite imagery relating to 1991 and earlier, which could facilitate the location of mass graves. It was noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq was to request from the Russian Federation imagery of the Khamisiyah site dating back to 1990 and 1991.

14. The National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs recalled that it had provided the Iraqi side with pictures of former Iraqi security officers believed to possess information about the burial sites and the coordinates of the known mass graves. The Senior Political Affairs Officer was told that the University of Alabama, in the United States, had developed new technology to analyse changes in the soil, which could help with the search for Kuwaiti and Iraqi human remains.

15. While commending the current search activities of Iraq, the National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs noted that all the 236 identified remains of missing persons and third-country nationals had been found by Kuwaiti specialized teams during search and exhumation operations in 2003 and 2004 in Karbala, Ramadi, Samawa, Nasseriya and at other sites. The National Committee underlined the need for Iraq to meet its commitments in the search for missing Kuwaiti nationals and achieve practical results, thereby expediting the realization of its international obligations in relation to the mandate.

16. Kuwaiti interlocutors stressed that the issue of missing persons remains a highly sensitive and emotional matter in Kuwait. The families of those whose remains have not been found and properly buried in Kuwait continue to live in pain and experience distress. They have the sympathy and support of Kuwaiti society.

17. Kuwaiti officials informed the Senior Political Affairs Officer that Kuwait was interested in developing good-neighbourly relations with Iraq and did not want Iraq to remain unnecessarily under Chapter VII, provided that Iraq fulfilled its outstanding obligations related to boundary maintenance and payment of compensation to the Iraqi farmers, a position spelled out in the letter of 17 September 2012 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, as referred to in paragraph 17 of my thirty-fourth report (S/2012/931). It was stressed that the national interest of Kuwait lay solely in the necessity of finding and returning missing Kuwaitis, or their remains, as well as archives, and having for that purpose a United Nations-supervised mechanism with reporting responsibilities to the Security Council. Mr. Abulhasan observed that oversight by the United Nations gave strength and credibility to the activities associated with the search for missing Kuwaiti nationals and property.

## III. Recent activities with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property

18. No credible facts or possible leads have emerged regarding the missing Kuwaiti national archives, whose return Kuwait considers essential, given their value for the history of the country. While in Iraq, the Senior Political Affairs Officer discussed the issue with Khalid Faisal Habeeb, Director of the Compensation and Properties Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mohammed Khudair al-Anbare, Deputy Head of the Legal Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and other Iraqi officials. In Kuwait, he met in turn with Nasser Al-Hayen, Deputy Director of the International Organizations Department, which is responsible in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the file of the return of Kuwaiti properties and archives.

19. The Iraqi interlocutors gave their assurance that Iraq had no interest in or intention of keeping any Kuwaiti property or using it for political ends. A concerted effort had been made to find properties and investigate the fate of the archives. Every item recovered was immediately returned to Kuwait, and considerable rewards had been announced and paid as an incentive to Iraqi citizens to come forward with items or information. The Senior Political Affairs Officer was provided with the list of items (annex I) found by Iraq and returned from 2002 to 2012 to Kuwait. On 8 May, I was informed by Mohamed Ali al-Hakim, Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq intended to deliver to Kuwait 57 tapes from the Kuwaiti Television Corporation, about 400 books, three albums with photographs of members of the Government of Kuwait and silverware stamped with the logo of the State of Kuwait.

20. Being aware that both Iraq and Kuwait had established committees on the Kuwaiti national archives and other properties, the Senior Political Affairs Officer considered it important to encourage the holding of a joint meeting of those bodies as soon as possible, with a view to exchanging information and coordinating the way forward. Upon returning to United Nations Headquarters, he was informed by a

communication from Iraq that the committees had convened on 15 May in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait. The Iraqi delegation was headed by the Ambassador of Iraq to Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti delegation was led by the Director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

21. The Iraqi delegation expressed its Government's determination to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to missing Kuwaiti properties and archives. It requested the Kuwaiti side to provide a description of the missing items from the archives of the Amiri Diwan, the Diwan of the Crown Prince and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kuwaiti side commended the efforts made by the relevant Iraqi authorities towards finding and returning Kuwaiti properties. Kuwait suggested that regular, quarterly meetings of the joint committee be held to discuss relevant developments. During the meeting, the items referred to in paragraph 19 were handed over to Kuwait.

## IV. Observations

22. The recent fulfilment by Iraq of its outstanding Chapter VII obligations related to its common border with Kuwait has put in place conditions conducive to greater progress in the relations between the two countries. There is thus a constructive atmosphere in which to decide the future of the mandate set out in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). The objectives of the mandate have not yet been met, despite the Iraqi authorities' strong commitment and efforts to deliver on both the Kuwaiti missing persons and property issues.

23. As for the future of the mandate, I would like to recall the four options for carrying out the functions of the mandate, as contained in paragraph 25 of my thirty-fourth report (S/2012/931): asking the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to fulfil this role; appointing an interim coordinator; replacing the High-level Coordinator; or assigning someone from United Nations Headquarters to assume the functions. In my previous report, I expressed hope that Kuwait and Iraq would come to a mutually acceptable arrangement on the issue. In its press statement of 20 June 2012 (SC/10680), the Security Council encouraged both sides to reach this most favourable outcome.

24. In connection with the future of the issue referred to in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), Nuri Kamel al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, was of the opinion that the mandate of the High-level Coordinator needed to be ended and the matter transferred to UNAMI (see annex II). The Prime Minister also noted that his country's obligations under Chapter VII with regard to Kuwaiti property, the Kuwaiti archives and missing Kuwaitis and third-country nationals should be ended and those issues addressed under Chapter VI of the Charter. Furthermore, Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, informed me in a letter dated 30 May 2013 that an agreement had been reached with Kuwait during his recent visit to the country to transfer the responsibility for the issues of Kuwaiti prisoners and missing persons and Kuwaiti property to UNAMI under Chapter VI (see annex III).

25. Outlining the views of his Government, Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Hamad Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, noted that Kuwait supported the proposal to ask UNAMI to follow up on the issue of

missing persons and that of missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, in accordance with Chapter VI (see S/2013/324, annex).

26. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq also indicated in his letter that in the event that the mission of UNAMI came to an end, the representative of the Secretariat could remain in his functions if necessary. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait also underlined that the Security Council should adopt a resolution that contained the following principal elements: (a) the follow-up of those issues would not end with the termination of the mandate of UNAMI; (b) the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the issues of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, should be submitted on dates other than those of his reports on the activities of UNAMI; and (c) a UNAMI official whose sole responsibility would be to follow up on those issues should be designated (see S/2013/324, annex).

27. The common ground attained by Iraq and Kuwait regarding the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and property is a significant achievement, signalling a new level of mutual trust and a fresh chapter in the relations between the two neighbouring countries.

28. Having carefully considered the views expressed by Iraq and Kuwait about the future of the mandate set out in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and noting their broad commonality, I would like to recommend to the Council that the mandate of the High-level Coordinator be terminated and its functions transferred to UNAMI, to be carried out under Chapter VI of the Charter. I take note of the proposals made by Iraq and Kuwait referred to in paragraph 26 above. Should the Council adopt a resolution, I will ensure its full implementation.

29. The Governments of Iraq and Kuwait have demonstrated statesmanship and respect for each other's national interests in reaching a mutually acceptable and beneficial arrangement. Should the Security Council agree with my recommendation, Iraq will exit Chapter VII with regard to this file and will be one step closer to restoring its international standing prior to resolution 661 (1990), an objective long sought by the leadership of the country following the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The transfer of responsibilities for the facilitation of the search for the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, or their remains, to UNAMI ensures the continued work on this humanitarian file under Chapter VI.

30. The issue of missing persons has ethical, legal and humanitarian implications for Kuwait, as stated in the letter of its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (see S/2013/324, annex). The open cases continue to cause suffering to the bereaved families. I have taken note of the commendable commitment of Iraq to the successful resolution of this issue and its active field engagement to that end. It is my hope that the continued concrete actions of Iraq on the ground will expedite the realization of practical results while reinforcing confidence between Iraq and Kuwait. This will certainly advance the humanitarian objective of uncovering the fate of the missing persons, grim though it may be, and informing their families.

31. Moreover, any future activities on this file should take into account that the Tripartite Commission, chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross, remains the primary, independent and fair international mechanism for dealing with the issue of missing persons. Close contact and coordination with its members is a prerequisite to achieving positive results in settling this longstanding humanitarian issue.

32. Understandably, Kuwait views the return of State archives seized by the regime of Saddam Hussein as indispensable for the preservation of the country's historical records. Along with the issue of missing Kuwaiti nationals, this file remains at the top of the country's agenda. I consider regular meetings of the recently created joint committee on properties as a step towards setting clear benchmarks for achieving progress and organizing the search for the missing Kuwaiti national archives and other properties. I welcome and encourage the continued efforts made by Iraq to clarify the whereabouts of the missing Kuwaiti archives and other items and bring about their return to Kuwait. UNAMI would facilitate such efforts, should the Security Council concur with my recommendation outlined above in paragraph 28 above.

33. In advance of a decision by the Security Council on the mandate, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my deep appreciation to the late Yuli Vorontsov and to Gennady Tarasov of the Russian Federation, who, in the capacity of High-level Coordinator, devoted their time and professional skills to carrying out from 2000 to 2012 the mandate set out in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and ensuring that its implementation builds trust between the two countries and contributes to the full normalization of their relations.

# Annex I

[Original: Arabic]

## Kuwaiti property handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities*

1. In 2002, the documents listed below were handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities at the Iraq-Kuwait border under United Nations supervision:

- State Security records: 69 boxes containing 182,133 documents;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 126 boxes containing 666,762 documents;
- Ministry of the Interior: 196 boxes containing 1,032,794 documents;
- Documents regarding the Iraq-Kuwait border: two boxes containing 5,879 documents;
- Ministry of Oil: 19 boxes containing 83,156 documents;
- Ministry of Defence: three boxes containing 1,540 documents;
- Kuwaiti Department of Citizenship: 1,099 bags containing 357,825 files;
- Certificates of Kuwaiti citizenship: 103 bags containing 357,825 certificates;
- Records of issuance of Kuwaiti citizenship: 251 records;
- Kuwaiti Department of Museums and Antiquities: one file containing 123 documents;
- Register of Kuwaiti civilian aircraft;
- 2,806 microfilms belonging to the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Bank of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti press;
- The handover reports confirm that, on its first cursory examination of the files of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kuwaiti delegation found five files belonging to the Amiri Diwan, containing 1,022 documents, and two files belonging to the Council of Ministers, containing 195 documents.

2. A number of oil paintings and silver swords were handed over in late 2002.

3. A large number of books belonging to the Kuwaiti National Assembly library were handed over in 2005.

4. On 2 March 2009, in the presence of the High-level Coordinator on the issue of Kuwaiti missing persons and property, Ambassador Gennady Tarasov, the Ministry handed over the Kuwaiti radio archive consisting of nine boxes containing all of the 4,539 audio and visual cassettes.

5. On 24 July 2009, the Ministry handed over 22 wooden boxes, a metal case and a plastic container containing silver coins, Kuwaiti postage stamps and the sum of 2,121,166 (two million, one hundred and twenty-one thousand, one hundred and sixty-six) Kuwaiti dinars in old-issue banknotes belonging to the Central Bank of Kuwait. The Security Council welcomed the return, describing it as a positive step taken by Iraq to further the confidence-building process.

* Security Council resolution 687 (1991) refers to the obligation of Iraq to return all Kuwaiti property.

6. On 20 February 2012, the Ministry handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities 136 microfilm cassettes containing the archive of *Al-Kuwait Al-Yawm*, the official gazette. The cassettes were handed over to the Ministry by a civilian in return for a sum paid by the Ministry at his request.

7. On 16 April 2012, the Ministry handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities Kuwaiti banknotes, coins, papers and safe keys belonging to the Central Bank of Kuwait.

8. On 17 April 2012, 15 microfilm cassettes containing the archives of the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Anba'* were handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities.

9. On 27 June 2012, the Ministry handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities 27 boxes from the Office of the Prime Minister, containing cassettes from the archives of Radio Kuwait, and two books belonging to Kuwait University.

# Annex II

## Note verbale dated 7 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Office of the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General and has the honour to attach herewith a copy of a letter from Nuri Kamel Al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (see enclosure).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq would deeply appreciate it if the attached letter could kindly be forwarded to its highest destination.

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

I received with pleasure your letter of 8 April 2013, in which you noted the positive developments in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations and Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations.

My Government has assiduously strived to fulfil all the obligations imposed on Iraq by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to implement Security Council resolution 833 (1993). I have directed the competent Iraqi authorities to do all that is required with regard to the maintenance of the border pillars and the demarcation of the border. With the support of your representative in Iraq, Mr. Martin Kobler, all relevant procedures have been completed fully. With regard to compensations for Iraqi farmers, I have ordered the formation of a committee to designate the farmers' names and specify the compensation owed to each of them. I have furthermore instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer the sum of $1.4 million that is deposited with the United Nations Secretariat to an Iraqi bank, in preparation for its disbursement to those Iraqi farmers who are entitled.

My Government looks forward to your cooperation with regard to the question of the return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains, as well as the return of Kuwaiti property and the Kuwaiti archives. The former United Nations High-level Coordinator, Mr. Kobler and the Kuwaiti Government can all testify to the tremendous efforts made by my Government to find those missing persons or discover their remains and locate Kuwaiti property and the Kuwaiti archives and to return them to Kuwait, in implementation of Iraq's obligations in that regard.

We hope that you will understand Iraq's role and the actions it has taken in that regard, as well as the need to end the mandate of the United Nations High-level Coordinator and transfer the matter to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. In addition, Iraq's obligations under Chapter VII with regard to Kuwaiti property, the Kuwaiti archives and missing Kuwaitis and third-country nationals should be ended, as those matters can be addressed, in the future, under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nuri Kamel **al-Maliki**
Prime Minister

# Annex III

## Note verbale dated 3 June 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Office of the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General and has the honour to attach herewith a copy of a letter from Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq dated 30 May 2013 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (see enclosure).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq would deeply appreciate it if the attached letter could kindly be forwarded to its highest destination.

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

I write with reference to the expiration of the mandate of the High-level Coordinator appointed pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) to follow up the issues of Kuwaiti prisoners and missing persons and Kuwaiti property. In view of its humanitarian dimensions, the issue of prisoners and missing persons is of the utmost importance to the Governments of the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait.

After consideration of the options which you put forward with regard to the two issues, we reached an agreement with the State of Kuwait during our visit of 29 May 2013 to transfer responsibility for those issues to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. When the mission of UNAMI comes to an end, the representative of the Secretariat could remain in his functions if necessary.

Lastly, I should like to express our appreciation for your efforts to support and assist Iraq in completing the fulfilment of its outstanding obligations as set forth in the Security Council resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2013/358

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2013
English
Original: Arabic

## Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Governments of the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq, mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and, in particular, the principles of mutual respect for independence and equal sovereignty, territorial integrity, the promotion of friendly relations and non-interference in internal affairs; desirous of developing bilateral relations for the benefit of their two kindred countries; acting in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations; have the honour to deposit a copy of the memorandum of understanding concluded on 28 May 2013 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq concerning practical arrangements for the maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary in accordance with Security Council resolution 833 (1993) (see annex).

We should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

On behalf of the Government of the State of Kuwait
(*Signed*) Mansour Ayyad S H A **Alotaibi**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Iraq
(*Signed*) Mohamed Ali **Alhakim**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations

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## Annex to the letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait concerning practical arrangements for the maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),

Recalling Security Council resolution 833 (1993) adopted by the Council at its 3224th meeting on 27 May 1993,

Recalling the letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, and the report of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission dated 20 May 1993 and contained in documents S/25811 and Add.1,

Recalling the recommendations of the Commission in respect of practical arrangements for the maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary, which are set forth in section X of the report,

Desirous of consolidating the progress made following the completion on 31 March 2013 of the work of the United Nations technical team, including the emplacement and demarcation of the boundary markers, in accordance with Security Council resolution 833 (1993),

Determined to develop bilateral relations for the benefit of the two kindred countries,

Acting in accordance with paragraph 105 of the final report of the Commission, which is contained in document S/25811 and was endorsed by Security Council resolution 833 (1993),

Emphasizing paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 833 (1993), which provides as follows:

> *underlines and reaffirms* its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary which has now been finally demarcated by the Commission and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 of resolution 773 (1992).

Have agreed as follows:

### Article I

A joint technical committee (referred to hereinafter as "the Committee") comprising experts from each country shall be established in order to maintain the physical representation of the boundary agreed between the two countries in accordance with Security Council resolution 833 (1993).

**Article II**

The Committee shall have the following tasks:

(a) Inspecting the pillars and markers on the Iraq-Kuwait boundary on an annual basis; ensuring that consecutive boundary pillars are intervisible; removing any obstacles to intervisibility;

(b) Verifying the witness markers of the boundary pillars and the pointer pillars;

(c) Taking the necessary action to re-erect, repair or replace the pillars and markers as required;

(d) Assessing the adequacy of boundary markers and putting in place any additional markers deemed useful, such as sign-posts, pillars or other markers;

(e) Ensuring that there is a paved road on either side of the boundary in order to facilitate access to the pillars.

**Article III**

The Committee shall meet on an annual basis every March, alternating between the two countries. It may hold other meetings during the year as necessary.

**Article IV**

The Committee shall address any and all problems regarding the boundary pillars and assess their adequacy.

**Article V**

The border security forces command of each country shall coordinate through the continuous exchange of information in order to preserve the boundary pillars, pointer pillars and witness markers.

**Article VI**

If the Committee is unable to perform the functions set forth above, the Parties shall consult with one another in order to resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with the provisions of Security Council resolution 833 (1993).

**Article VII**

A copy of this memorandum of understanding shall be deposited with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article VIII**

This memorandum of understanding shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

This memorandum of understanding was drawn up in Kuwait City on Tuesday, 18 Rajab, A.H. 1434 (28 May, A.D. 2013) in two original copies in the Arabic language.

(*Signed*) Sabah Khalid Al Hamad **Al Sabah**
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the State of Kuwait

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq